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Abstract 
Firms that engage in exporting normally enter their first export markets a number of years 
after beginning to sell locally, then enter subsequent export markets progressively.  Standard 
trade models are essentially static and do not capture these elementary facts about exporting, 
which biases the estimation of trade patterns and limits understanding of potentially 
important aspects of firms’ exporting behaviour.  This paper proposes a model for the timing 
of entry to new export markets.  The model endogenously generates the timing of entry to 
each market through a learning mechanism: the fixed cost of entry to a given export market is 
reduced by the experience gained from having entered other markets.  More productive firms 
are less sensitive to the learning effect and therefore (1) enter markets more quickly and (2) 
enter larger markets earlier and smaller markets later than less productive firms.  These 
predictions are confirmed using Swedish firm-level data.  The latter prediction in particular is 
difficult to explain using alternative mechanisms and therefore endorses the learning effect as 
an explanation for the timing of entry.  The model additionally predicts that more productive 
firms export more widely and that firms of all productivity levels enter nearer markets earlier, 
which are strong features of the data. 
Keywords: firm heterogeneity, fixed costs, export market entry, export timing 
JEL classification: D83, F12, F17 
1.  Introduction 
This paper proposes a model for the timing of entry to export markets that is based on 
experience in the process of entry.  The costs of entering a given market are lower the more 
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1 experience a firm has in entering new markets, which provides an incentive for the firm to 
delay entry.  The fixed cost reduction trades-off against foregone exporting revenue to 
generate the timing of entry endogenously.  The model allows for heterogeneity in firm 
productivity, using the heterogeneous firms framework of Melitz (2003), as well as in the 
sizes and transport costs associated with the various export destinations.  The model 
generates a number of predictions that are confirmed using Swedish firm-level data, 
providing evidence for the type of learning mechanism proposed in the model. 
The timing of entry is an important aspect of trade patterns that is not captured by standard 
trade models, which effectively assume that new firms are formed in their mature state, with 
fully-developed exporting behaviour.  In reality, new firms are formed regularly and firms 
that eventually export often take several years to enter their first export market, then enter 
new markets progressively.  Therefore, what appears to be a non-exporter in the data may 
simply be a firm that has not yet begun to export.  To properly explain exporting patterns, it is 
necessary to treat the timing of entry.  Furthermore, as firms presumably make the decisions 
about the timing of entry based on some underlying factors that are not currently well 
understood, the investigation of the delays is potentially informative about the process by 
which firms become exporters. 
The model for the timing of entry proposed in this paper is based on experience in the process 
of entry to new export markets: the more markets a firm has entered, the more expertise it has 
about entering new markets and the lower the fixed costs of entry it faces to any given 
market.  The firm therefore has an incentive to delay entry to each market as this implies a 
lower fixed cost of entry, provided that other markets are entered in the meantime.  On the 
other hand, delaying entry implies a period of foregone revenue.  The trade-off between the 
reduced entry costs and the foregone revenue endogenously generates the timing of entry.  If 
the reduction in entry costs exceeds the foregone revenue, then it is optimal for the firm to 
delay entry, and vice versa. 
The fixed cost of entry reflects the costs of adapting products and production processes, 
reaching consumers through advertising, and setting up a distribution network.  These tasks 
are generally more costly for larger markets, so the fixed cost of entry is increasing in market 
2 size.
3  The fixed cost of entry in the model is decreasing in the number of markets already 
entered, to reflect the accumulation of knowledge in the required tasks and the potential for 
the same adaptation to be applied to several markets.  Furthermore, the savings are larger in 
absolute terms if the market subsequently entered is larger. 
The model generates a number of predictions about export expansion patterns that are tested 
and confirmed using Swedish firm-level data.  These predictions are as follows: (1) more 
productive firms enter export markets more quickly; (2) more productive firms enter larger 
markets earlier and smaller markets later than less productive firms; and (3) all firms enter 
nearer markets earlier than more distant markets, controlling for market size.  The second 
prediction in particular is specific to the learning mechanism proposed here and would be 
difficult to explain using alternative mechanisms that could not be interpreted as the fixed 
costs of entry being reduced by experience.  Therefore, though the fixed cost of entry cannot 
be observed directly, the empirical tests of these predictions serve as an indirect test of the 
existence of the learning mechanism. 
The predictions each follow intuitively from the model.  The fixed costs of entry do not 
depend on firm productivity, whereas exporting revenues are an increasing function of firm 
productivity.
4  Therefore the number of markets for which a firm earns positive exporting 
revenue is increasing in its productivity.  Similarly, the revenue foregone by delaying entry to 
a given market exceeds the fixed cost reduction for firms above a certain productivity 
threshold, so more productive firms enter new markets after shorter delays.  And the 
difference between foregoing revenue to the larger rather than the smaller market is greater 
for more productive firms, while the difference in aggregate fixed costs is identical for all 
firms, so more productive firms enter larger markets earlier and smaller markets later than 
less productive firms.  The intuition is that as more productive firms earn higher revenues but 
face the same fixed entry costs, exporting revenues are relatively more important and entry 
costs relatively less important the more productive the firm.  This is reflected in the more 
productive firms maximising exporting revenue by entering markets earlier and entering the 
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3 larger of those first, whereas less productive firms enter markets more slowly and begin by 
exporting to smaller markets. 
To focus the model on the market-level pattern of entry, it is assumed that firms are not able 
to enter only part of an export market by paying a lower fixed cost, in contrast to Arkolakis 
(2010).  Allowing partial entry would permit an additional and realistic channel for the 
accumulation of experience, but one more informative for the degree of market penetration 
than for the timing or order of entry.  Export markets are defined to be countries (sovereign 
states) as this is a relatively distinct geographical delimitation, though the model could be 
applied at other levels.  Country borders remain important, even in relatively integrated 
regions such as the European Union (EU) or North America, judging by the obstacles that 
they represent for trade and for market integration.
5  Furthermore, national media outlets and 
transport networks that prioritise internal routes favour the country as an appropriate level of 
aggregation for advertising and the establishment of distribution networks, which the fixed 
cost of entry is assumed to represent.  The empirical results presented below confirm the 
empirical predictions at the country level, suggesting that this is an important level of 
aggregation, whatever other levels of aggregation may also be relevant. 
The assumption that experience reduces the fixed costs of entering new export markets is part 
of what the empirical section of this paper aims to verify.  There is, however, some existing 
empirical support for this assumption.  The survey responses of UK firms in Kneller and Pisu 
(2006, 2007) show that exporting experience reduces the perceived barriers to entry to new 
markets.  Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2011) and Schmeiser (2011) identify exporting patterns 
that are suggestive of firms learning to export.  An alternative to the model proposed here 
could involve learning about the production process, so exporting would instead improve the 
productivity of the firm.  However, it is at best unclear from the large empirical literature on 
the topic whether exporting activity affects productivity, so the reduced fixed cost of 
establishing new export markets is a more intuitive and less ambiguous route for the benefits 
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4 of experience to accrue.
6  In any case, the empirical tests conducted below use firm 
productivity measured in the first year of operation and therefore could not be driven by an 
effect of exporting on productivity. 
This paper contributes to the literature on export market entry in a number of ways.  Firstly, it 
presents a simple explanation for firms delaying entry to new export markets that is supported 
by empirical evidence.  A recently-proposed alternative explanation is based on ex ante 
uncertainty about exporting success, which is described below.  Other studies have identified 
factors that could motivate delayed entry, but do not address this point explicitly.  In fact, the 
model presented here can be interpreted as representing a range of mechanisms in simplified 
form, so in a sense it synthesises the timing aspects of a range of existing and potential 
models.  Though the mechanism in the model is described as a learning effect, alternative 
interpretations could include credit, liquidity, or management constraints.
7  Such alternative 
explanations would fit with the model as long as the aggregate entry costs were lower if entry 
to some markets is delayed, and aggregate entry costs were lower if the smaller markets were 
entered first. 
A closely-related alternative explanation for delays in entry to that proposed here concerns 
uncertainty in exporting profitability, as featured in Nguyen (2011), Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, 
Kugler, and Tybout (2011), and Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012).  In 
these models, an inexperienced firm has limited information about the profitability of 
exporting that is updated in a Bayesian fashion as the firm gains experience by exporting to 
new markets.  The delays are thus motivated by the benefits of the firm being informed 
before deciding whether to enter a (potentially unprofitable) market.  This type of model also 
provides a neat explanation of why firms sometimes exit from export markets.  By contrast, 
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5 the model presented in this paper has a foreseeable improvement from experience in the 
firm’s effectiveness as an exporter. 
The second main contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates an empirical link between 
firm productivity and the speed of entry to new export markets.  The link between 
productivity and participation in exporting has long been recognised (Bernard, Jensen, 
Redding, and Schott, 2007).  The empirical finding that more productive firms also enter new 
markets more quickly fits naturally with this idea.  The result does, however, demand an 
intuitive explanation, for which the model proposed in this paper provides a candidate. 
Thirdly, this paper is the first to explain some of the variation in the order of entry to export 
markets and to attribute this to an underlying factor.  Namely, the model predicts that more 
productive firms enter larger markets earlier and smaller markets later, which is shown to be 
consistent with the data.  This includes selection of the initial export destinations, as less 
productive firms tend to start exporting to smaller countries.  Lawless (2009) modelled the 
order of entry but assumed idiosyncratic demand and fixed cost parameters, which led to the 
prediction that all firms enter markets in the same order.  Though this prediction has some 
support in the inter-firm correlation of entry orders she identified using Irish data, and which 
is also present in the Swedish data, there remains a large amount of variation in entry orders 
to be explained.  Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2011) and Chaney (2011) identified factors that 
partly explain elements of the order of entry, namely the tendency for firms that export to 
certain markets to subsequently enter markets with similar characteristics.  However, the 
between-firm variation in entry orders in these models results entirely from exogenous 
variation in the sets of markets initially entered, so they do not explain what differentiates a 
firm that enters one sequence of markets from a firm that enters a different sequence.  In 
contrast, the model presented here explains why the entry orders differ depending on firm 
productivity, which is supported by the data. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the model is presented in section 2; the 
optimal entry strategies are discussed in section 3; the data on Swedish manufacturing firms 
are described in section 4; the model is tested using the Swedish data in section 5; and 
concluding remarks are presented in section 6. 
6 2.  Model 
The economy in the model is comprised of the firm’s home country and I foreign countries 
that the firm may choose to export to.  There are a large number of other firms operating in 
the economy, so each individual firm does not consider the effects of its export decisions on 
price levels or the strategies of other firms.  To enter any given export market, the firm must 
sink an initial fixed cost, which is an increasing function of market size and, to reflect 
experience, a decreasing function of the number of destinations that the firm already exports 
to.  After entering the market, the firm receives a constant revenue stream.  The firm has full 
ex ante information about the fixed costs of entry and the levels of exporting revenue 
associated with all potential export markets.  As the fixed cost of entry is decreasing in the 
number of export destinations, the firm may benefit in the long term by entering markets 
gradually.  The model is outlined in detail in this section. 
2.1.  Consumers 
The consumers in the model are assumed to have identical, constant elasticity of substitution 
preferences of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type, with demand elasticity  1 > σ .  Where a 
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 is an index that reflects the overall level of prices. 
2.2.  Firms 
Firms in the model are assumed to be of the increasing returns to scale, heterogeneous 
productivity type proposed by Melitz (2003), in which each firm realises its productivity after 
it is formed.
8  The productivity realisation is expressed in terms of the firm’s idiosyncratic 
per-unit cost of production,  , which defines its productivity,  .  Upon realising its 






8 An alternative definition of firm heterogeneity would be in product quality rather than productivity, with firms 
having uniform production costs but different levels of demand.  The two approaches are effectively equivalent, 
however, as the important point is that a better firm earns higher profits in all markets.  A model based on 
product quality would generate predictions identical to those presented below. 
7 home market, and what strategy to employ in entering export markets.  There is some fixed 
cost associated with establishing a firm, which in equilibrium offsets the expected operating 
profits and ensures that firms are formed at a positive and finite rate.  Firms fail at a constant
rate according to a Poisson process.  The price of the sole production i
 
nput is normalised to 
one, so the firm maximises profits by setting its output price equal to  () 1 − = σ σ ω ω a p . 
2.3.  Export revenues 
The firm is faced with I potential export markets, where market i  s gross domestic product
(GDP)  i Y  and an overall level of prices represented by the index  i P .  Transport costs are of
the iceberg type, with  i
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This expression may be simplified slightly by defining the ‘size’ of an export destination to 
be its GDP adjusted for the toughness of competition from other firms,  i i i Y P s
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9 The exporting revenue is net of production costs but gross of fixed entry costs. 
10 The sales volume is not identical for markets of all sizes, in contrast to the standard constant elasticity of 
substitution model with uniform fixed costs for all markets.  Fixed costs are increasing in market size, which 
was shown by Akerman and Forslid (2008) to lead to higher per-firm export volumes to larger markets.  In this 
model the exact characterisation of revenue as a function of market size in general equilibrium would be 
difficult to obtain due to the complexity of the set of different strategies, which depends on the assumed 
distribution of firm productivity in each country, and the endogenous fixed cost function explained below.  Such 
an exact solution would not in any case enhance the model, as the solution would be replicable as a particular 
case of the model here through the choice of subjective parameters. 
8 The fixed costs of exporting are sunk upon entry and the per-unit revenue (2) is strictly 
positive, so once the firm has entered market i it receives a permanent stream of revenues of 
 in each period from sales to that market.  The firm is assumed to have a per-period 
discount factor 
() i s r
β , reflecting the probability of survival, so the long-term revenue from 
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Substituting in (2) yields: 










2.4.  Fixed costs of entry to export markets 
The model assumes a fixed cost of entry to each new export market, which reflects the costs 
of adapting products to meet specific technical or cultural standards,
 finding customers, and 
setting up a distribution network.  A number of studies have found positive plant-level fixed 
costs associated with entry into new export markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and 
Wagner, 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007).  However, there 
is little evidence of ongoing fixed costs associated with continuing to export; indeed, Das, 
Roberts, and Tybout (2007) found that such ongoing fixed costs were not significantly 
different from zero.  The model design follows these results, with positive fixed costs 
incurred to enter a new market but no ongoing fixed costs of exporting.
11 
The fixed cost of entry into export market i at time t is represented by the function 
, where   is the size of the market and   is the number of export destinations 
entered before period t, reflecting the firm’s experience as an exporter.
( t i
X n s f , )
                                                
i s t n
12  As in the demand 
specification, the market size reflects both GDP and the lack of competition from other firms, 
factors assumed to be correlated with the difficulty of entering an export market.  Experience 
 
11 This restriction precludes one mechanism for firm exit from export markets, in which a firms that exports to 
an unprofitable market simply to gain experience in setting up export operations would subsequently exit were 
the ongoing revenue to be negative.  Such a feature is, however, beside the point of the current paper. 
12 Distance is likely to be correlated with some factors that affect the cost of entry, such as language differences.  
However, including distance as a factor in the fixed cost function would not affect the main predictions of the 
model, so it is left out in the interests of simplicity. 
9 accrues after one period, which drives the endogenous timing of entry: firms delay entry to 
certain markets while they accumulate experience from entry to other markets, if the fixed 
cost reduction exceeds the foregone revenue.  Experience is measured as the number of 
destinations, so the amount of learning is independent of market size.  This simplifies the 
model without affecting its predictions, which require only that the amount of experience 
gained be a larger multiple of the fixed cost of entry for smaller markets.  Unlike in Arkolakis 
(2010), the firm does not have the option to enter part of the market and incur only a fraction 
of the fixed cost. 
To generate the theoretical results presented in this paper, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions on the fixed cost function are that: (1) it be increasing in the size of the market but 
non-increasing per unit of size, so that   and  0 >
X
s f s f f
X X
s ≤ ; (2) it be a decreasing 






13 and (3) the absolute reduction from 
experience be greater for larger markets, so that  .  The first of these conditions 
ensures that larger markets are more profitable, which is necessary to generate the variation 
in entry orders.  The second condition is necessary for delayed entry to be optimal.  The third 
condition allows the orders of entry to export markets to be non-uniform, by creating a trade-
off between lower overall fixed entry costs and higher foregone exporting revenues if the 
smaller or larger market is entered first.
0
14 
To illustrate the type of process that the fixed cost is supposed to represent, a specific, micro-
founded functional form for   is presented here.  Certain tasks associated with 
entry, such as product adaptation, may be independent of country size, whereas other tasks, 
such as advertising, are higher for larger countries.  For simplicity, it is assumed that 
elements of the fixed cost of entry may be grouped into a component that does not depend on 
market size and a component that is a constant multiple of market size.  The costs of these 
components are represented b const 0 >
( t i
X n s f ,
y the 
)
ants μ  and  0 > ν , respectively.  The units are 
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formally  , as the potential benefits of experience would eventually wane and the costs of entry would 




14 The implications of the three necessary and sufficient conditions are demonstrated formally in appendix 2. 
10 scaled such that the fixed cost of entry to a market of size  i s  for a firm with no exporting 
experience is  i s ν μ + . 
The fixed cost of entry to a given market is assumed to decrease with the number of markets 
already entered, as this experience broadens the firm’s range of competencies.  For instance, 
product adaptations and advertisements may have characteristics that can be applied to 
further markets.  Many such dimensions of adaptation exist and the fixed cost of entry for a 
given market is increasing in the degree of adaptation required along each dimension.  
Formally, to enter market i the firm must adapt along each dimension  [ K k , 0 ] ∈  to the value 
.  Once the firm has conducted this adaptation, the value   becomes an element of its 
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, where M is the set of markets entered by 
the previous period and includes the home market by definition.  The cost of adapting the 
product in dimension k is a constant multiple of the difference between   and the nearest 
element of the firm’s existing competencies  .  Each dimension is a unit circle (zero and 
one are equivalent values) so no country is more central than any other in terms of culture 




i η ( ) 1 , 0 U  distributions and are independent 
and identically distributed.
15  Where n is the number of markets already entered, the 
probability distribution for the difference between a new draw of   and the nearest existing 
competency in   is 
k
i η
k θ ( )( 1− )
1 − n 2 2 = z n z g .  It follows that the total cost of adapting over a 
continuum of dimensions is proportional to  ( ) 1 1 + n .
16  The scale-independent and per-unit 
components of the fixed cost each correspond to a continuum of dimensions, so both are 
reduced by experience by the same proportion.  If the inexperienced firm faces a fixed entry 
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The functional form in (5) naturally satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions outlined 
above for the fixed cost function. 
 
15 The model therefore differs from Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2011) in that adaptation is not country-specific. 
16 The derivation of this expression is given in appendix 1. 
11 2.5.  Long-term profits 
As production costs and exporting demand are constant and deterministic in the model, it is 
never optimal for a firm to drop out of an export market it has already entered, as the revenue 
in each period must be positive for the firm to enter in the first place.
17  The overall entry 
strategy can therefore be expressed as a vector t of integer values representing the period in 
which each particular market is entered.  That is, the firm enters market i in period  , where 
by convention period zero is the initial period and 
i t
∞ = i t  if the firm does not enter market i 
at all.  Substituting in the expression for single-period revenue (4), the discounted payoff of 






















σ )  (6) 
As stated above, the expected profits from operating in the home market and the exporting 
payoff expressed in (6) are equal to the fixed cost of establishing a firm, which ensures that 
the flow of new firms is positive and finite.  Following Chaney (2008), it is assumed that any 
profits are redistributed among individuals in the firm’s home country as dividends. 
3.  Optimal export entry strategy 
The firm optimally chooses the export markets and entry times that maximise net exporting 
profits (6).  The optimal strategy is characterised by the vector of market entry times t
*. 
3.1.  Productivity ordering of firms 
A relationship between firm productivity and the optimal strategy can be inferred from the 
expression for the strategy payoff in (6).  The payoff is linear and increasing in the 
productivity factor  , as the revenue from each market is proportional to firm productivity 
while the fixed entry costs are independent of firm productivity.  The multiplier on firm 
productivity is proportional to the term 






1 φ β , a single variable that combines the 
                                                 
17 With a positive ongoing fixed cost of exporting this may not hold true, even in the absence of uncertainty, as 
the firm could enter a market to benefit from that experience even if revenue from exporting to that market is 
less than the ongoing fixed cost.  In such a case the firm would not continue exporting to the market once it had 
benefited from the experience of establishing the export operation. 
12 number of markets entered, the sizes of those markets, and the timing of entry.  The term A is 
henceforth referred to as the ‘aggressiveness’ of the strategy characterised by t.
18 
 
Figure 1.  Strategy payoffs as functions of firm productivity levels. 
Now consider the three hypothetical strategies illustrated in Figure 1, which are numbered in 
increasing order of firm productivity so that  ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 2 1 A A A < < .  As each strategy payoff is 
linear in productivity, the payoffs from any given pair of strategies may intersect at most 
once.  If the payoffs do intersect then the productivity level at which they intersect constitutes 
a threshold, with the more aggressive strategy being preferable for all firms above the 
productivity threshold and vice versa.  An example is illustrated in Figure 1, in which   
represents the threshold between strategies 1 and 3.  Identical reasoning applies to any pair of 
strategies and results in a positive and monotonic ordering, with more aggressive strategies 
employed by more productive firms.  It should be noted that some potential strategies may 
not be optimal for any firms and therefore do not appear in the productivity ordering, as is the 




3 , 1 a
Figure 1.  The remainder of this section outlines the features of the 
optimal strategies that can be inferred from (6). 
                                                 
18 According to this formulation a strategy is more aggressive if the markets entered are nearer.  Though it is not 
clear how the distances to export markets should be related to the concept of aggressiveness, in the model all 
firms enter nearer markets rather than or no later than more distant markets, so the distinction is not important.  
13 3.2.  Timing of entry to new export markets 
The following proposition characterises the relationship between firm productivity and the 
speed of entry to new export markets. 
Proposition 1. Under optimal strategies, the time taken to enter a given set of markets is 
weakly increasing in firm productivity. 
Proof. See appendix 3. 
The prediction that more productive firms enter markets more quickly results from the trade-
off underlying the decision about the timing of entry: delaying entry until other markets have 
been entered implies reduced fixed entry costs, but also foregone revenue.  Firms delay entry 
if and only if the fixed cost reduction exceeds the foregone revenue.  As fixed entry costs are 
independent of productivity whereas exporting revenues are increasing in productivity, 
immediate entry is optimal only for the firms above some productivity threshold.  This trade-
off is illustrated in Figure 2.  The same reasoning applies to each export market, so the 
overall relationship between firm productivity and the time taken to enter a given set of 
markets is non-increasing.  Intuitively, more productive firms earn more exporting revenue 
from any given market so the foregone revenue is relatively important for these firms, 
whereas for less productive firms the reduction in fixed entry costs is relatively important. 
The home country is considered to be a market from which the firm gains experience.  This 
implies that more productive firms also enter their first export market after a shorter delay. 
14  
Figure 2.  Trade-off involved in delaying entry to an export market, by firm productivity level. 
3.3.  Order of entry by market size 
A novel feature of the model is that it generates endogenous variation in the orders of entry to 
export markets.  Firms have opposing incentives either to (1) enter smaller markets first, to 
maximise gains from experience in setting up export destinations, or (2) enter larger markets 
first, to receive higher revenues in the near term.  The model generates both types of pattern.  
It is even possible that some firms enter unprofitable markets, simply in order to gain 
experience that makes it more profitable to export elsewhere in later periods.  The 
relationship between firm productivity and the optimal order of entry to markets of different 
sizes is summarised in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Under optimal strategies, firms that enter the larger of two markets before the 
smaller market are more productive than firms that enter these markets in the opposite order, 
controlling for the entry times to all other markets. 
Proof. See appendix 3. 
The prediction made in proposition 2 results from a trade-off between the benefits of 
attaining revenues earlier and of reducing fixed entry costs.  More productive firms earn more 
revenue from each market, which implies that attaining exporting revenues earlier is 
relatively important for more productive firms.  As less productive firms earn less revenue 
from each market, the fixed costs of entry are relatively important.  This results in more 
15 productive firms entering the larger market first in order to earn more revenue in the earlier 
period, whereas less productive firms enter the smaller market first in order to benefit from 
the larger aggregate reduction in fixed entry costs.
19  For parameters that permit both orders 
to be optimal for some set of firms, the firms that enter the larger market first are necessarily 
more productive than those that enter the smaller market first. 
The pattern outlined in proposition 2 extends to any subset of exporting strategies.  Amongst 
firms that eventually enter the same set of markets, this produces an overall ordering in which 
more productive firms tend to export to larger markets earlier whereas less productive firms 
enter smaller markets earlier.
20 
While the predictions made in proposition 1 may be able to be explained by a number of 
alternative factors, the prediction made in proposition 2 is more specific.  It requires a model 
of a particular type, similar to that proposed here.  Namely, the model must have a benefit 
that accrues from exporting to some markets, is realised when other markets are subsequently 
entered, and is increasing in the size of the market subsequently entered. 
The prediction that export market entry orders are dependent on firm productivity implies 
that a degree of variation in entry orders between firms is generated endogenously, a novel 
feature of the model.  Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2011) and Chaney (2011) generate 
variation in market entry orders, as firms tend to enter export markets near markets they 
already export to, which fit with empirical export patterns.  However, the variation in export 
patterns results from randomness in the sets of initial export markets, so these models do not 
explain why entry orders vary between firms.  The learning mechanism could explain part of 
the heterogeneity in orders of export market entry observed for French firms in Eaton, 
Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) and for Irish firms by Lawless (2009). 
                                                 
19 It is trivially not optimal for any firms to enter the smaller market first if the reduction in fixed entry costs 
from experience is not increasing in market size, as this foregoes higher revenue in the near term without any 
overall decrease in the fixed costs of entry.  This is shown formally in appendix 2. 
20 Such a pattern is related to the theory that less productive exporters begin by exporting small volumes by 
Rauch and Watson (2003), which could correspond either to exporting progressively larger amounts to the same 
markets, entering progressively larger export markets, or some combination of both. 
16 3.4.  Transport costs and the order of entry 
The model implies a strict relationship between the distances, in terms of transport costs, to a 
pair of otherwise identical markets, and the order in which the markets are entered.
21  This 
relationship is specified in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Under optimal strategies, all firms enter a nearer market (lower transport 
costs) no later than a more distant market (higher transport costs) of the same size. 
Proof. See appendix 3. 
The prediction that firms will enter a nearer market before a more distant market is a simple 
product of discounting: if one market yields a larger net profit, then a higher discounted profit 
is earned by entering that market earlier.  For markets are of different sizes, the nearer market 
is entered first if the relative distance to that market is below a certain threshold, where the 
threshold level depends on the sizes of the markets and on firm productivity. 
Proposition 3 fits with intuition given the strength of the gravity model of trade in explaining 
empirical trade patterns, with the two principal factors being market size and distance 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).  The prediction here is related: not only do firms export 
more to nearer or otherwise more accessible markets, but they also enter these markets 
earlier.  As with the gravity model, the sizes of markets and other factors not made explicit in 
the current model also play a role, but in general firms are predicted to begin by exporting to 
neighbouring countries and then expand to progressively more distant markets. 
As outlined in the discussion of proposition 2, the order in which markets of different sizes 
are entered by different firms is not uniform, but varies depending on firm productivity.  
Therefore, the model does not generate an ordering of markets based solely on their sizes.  
However, in general the model predicts that larger markets will yield higher net profits, 
which is consistent with firms generally entering larger markets earlier. 
3.5.  Market size and transport costs 
This section puts the predictions made in propositions 2 and 3 into context with each other 
and illustrates how the combination of differences in market sizes and distances affect the 
                                                 
21 Henceforth, the term ‘distance’ is used as shorthand for the costliness of transporting goods to a given market.  
To avoid confusion, it is used only in contexts where the two concepts intersect. 
17 order of entry.  Figure 3 shows the optimal order of entry to two particular markets, m1 and 
m2, as a function of the market sizes and the transport cost parameters.  The sizes of m1 and 
m2 are denoted   and  , respectively, with m1 defined to be the (weakly) smaller of the 
two markets.  The transport cost parameters for the two markets are denoted 
1 s 2 s
1 φ  and  2 φ .  The 
horizontal axis represents the size of m1 and the vertical axis represents the transport cost 
parameter for m1.  Both the size and transport cost parameters for m1 may be compared with 
the equivalent values for m2, which are marked on the respective axes.  As m1 is defined to 
be no larger than m2, the size of m2 defines the maximum value on the horizontal axis.  In the 
interests of clarity, the possibilities of one or both of the markets not being entered or of the 
two markets being entered simultaneously in the optimal strategy are ignored. 
 
Figure 3.  Optimal orders of entry to m1 and m2 given market sizes and transport costs. 
The parameter space in Figure 3 is divided by the line that represents equal exporting 
revenues,  2 2 1 1 s s φ φ = , into two regions that represent qualitatively different sets of strategies.  
The discounted sum of the fixed entry costs is strictly higher when entering the larger market 
first than when entering the smaller market first, as  .  The higher entry costs from 
entering the larger market first are worth incurring if earlier entry to the larger market 
provides a gain in revenue that at least compensates for the higher fixed costs.  This is 
trivially impossible if the larger market is sufficiently distant relative to the smaller market 




18 market first in cases where  2 2 1 1 s s φ φ >  and the set of such parameters is marked in Figure 3 as 
“m1 first”.  For the remaining parameters, all firms above a certain productivity threshold 
enter the larger market first, whereas firms below the productivity threshold enter the smaller 
market first.  A number of these productivity thresholds are illustrated in Figure 4.
22  
Effectively, firm productivity would represent a third dimension on this diagram. 
 
Figure 4.  Parameter borders for optimal orders of entry given selected productivity levels.  For 
parameters below each border, m2 is entered first, for parameters above the border, m1 is entered first. 
For firms with productivity approaching zero, exporting revenues are insignificant compared 
to fixed entry costs in the decision about which of the markets to enter first, so such firms 
would simply enter the smaller market first.  The productivity threshold at the lower limit of 
firm productivity would therefore coincide with the line  2 1 s s = .  For firms with productivity 
approaching infinity, the fixed entry costs would be insignificant compared with exporting 
revenues, so the decision of which market to enter first would be based solely on which 
market yields the highest revenue.  The productivity threshold at the upper limit of firm 
productivity would therefore coincide with the line  2 2s 1 1s φ φ = .  The productivity thresholds 
for all intermediate levels of productivity vary monotonically between these two lines, with 
                                                 
22 The parameters used in this example are  1 2 = s ,  5 . 0 2 = φ ,  9 . 0 = β , and  ( ) ( )( ) n s n s f
X + + = 1 1 , . 
19 all passing through the point where  2 1 s s =  and  2 1 φ φ =  as implied by proposition 3.
23  
Several of these thresholds are marked in Figure 4. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the range of parameters for which the larger market (m2) is 
entered first expands as firm productivity increases, always to a superset of the parameters 
that imply the same pattern for less productive firms.  This relationship applies over the full 
range of productivity values, consistent with proposition 2. 
One way of interpreting the productivity thresholds is in terms of the market parameters 
displayed in Figure 4.  Relative to each threshold along a vertical slice of the parameter 
space, firms with the productivity level reflected by the threshold enter the smaller market 
(m1) first for pairs of markets with higher  1 φ  values than the threshold and vice versa.  That 
is, if either market is nearer than implied by the productivity threshold, then it is entered 
earlier.
24  As this applies to all productivity levels, the nearer a market is, the more firms 
enter it before a given alternative, a generalisation of proposition 3 to markets of any relative 
sizes. 
ations 
s not generate a general prediction 
about the order of entry in terms of r a
cs 
                                                
On the other hand, similar generalisations about the order of entry in terms of market sizes 
cannot be inferred from the model, as is also apparent from Figure 4.  For some combin
of transport costs and firm productivity, a market is entered first if it is above a certain 
threshold size relative to the other market, while in other cases the market size must be below 
a certain threshold.  Due to this irregularity, the model doe
elative m rket sizes. 
4.  Data 
The data used in this paper are a panel of Swedish firm-level data supplied by Statisti
Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån) for all years from 1997 to 2007.  The data include 
information on firm characteristics (wages, numbers of employees, investments, inputs, 
locations of plants and headquarters, and so on) and the amount of exports for each firm in 
 
23 When the two markets are the same size, the nearer market is entered first by firms of all productivity levels. 
24 As the revenue from m1 is directly related to its size, the value of  1 φ  becomes unimportant to the decision of 
which market to enter first as   approaches zero.  For values of   at the lower limit, the order of entry is 
determined by whether the discounted reduction in the fixed cost of entering m2 from experience is greater than 
one period of revenue from m2. 
1 s 1 s
20 each year by destination country.  Data on the GDP levels of each country in 2010 are from
the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank.  Data on the distances of 
countries from Sweden are the distance between the principal cities
 
 from the CEPII (Centre 






h there is enough information in the data to 




Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main firm-level variables in the sample. 
                                                
The sample is restricted to manufacturing firms, in the interests of both internal consistenc
and consistency with the model, and to firms with at least five employees.  The empirical 
tests conducted in this paper require a sample of new firms, with information on the year of
formation of each firm and its year of entry to each export destination.  The new firms are 
identified by restricting the sample to those firms that are not present in the first year of th
panel but appear thereafter.  To avoid falsely classifying subsidiaries or the divestiture of 
certain operations as independent firms, an index maintained by Statistics Sweden is used to
identify such entities, which are then excluded.
25  Firm productivity is estimated in the first 
year of operation for each firm using the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (20
Each sample is restricted to firms for whic
The data are aggregated by two-digit manufacturing industry.  To avoid spurious variatio
from industries with few firms, only two-digit industries with at least 50 Swedish firms 
operating during the relevant period are included in the sample.  A small fraction (around 
5%) of manufacturing firms operate in more than one industry; these firms are excluded d
to potential complications in characterising productivity levels and market entry orde
 
25 The index groups firms that have had common ownership at some stage of their existence.  In Statistics 
Sweden terminology, the index is the set of “FAD” codes.  Firms with FAD codes that were present in 1997 are 
excluded.  Where multiple firms have the same FAD code, all but the first to appear are excluded.  The results 
are robust to stricter definitions of ‘new’ firms that only include firms that first appear in 1999 or later, as shown 
in appendix 5. 
21 Mean Std.  dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
  Number of employees 54.5  426.7  5  20,963 
  Payroll (mSEK) 15.4  97.7  0.1  3,820.0 
  Capital stock (mSEK) 16.4  155.0  0.0  5,360.0 
  Estimated productivity in first year of operation 12.4  33.2  0.0  1,812.0 
  Number of export destinations 4.9  10.7  0  129 
  Value of exports (mSEK) 33.5  298.0  0.0  13,100.0 
  Note: 3,352 firms in total, of which 2,294 engage in exporting; firm productivity estimated using
     the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, measured in the first year of operation; annual
     given for all other variables, for all years from 1998 to 2007 the firm was operating
 figures
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics for the sample of new Swedish manufacturing firms formed 1998 to 2007. 
The empirical tests conducted in this paper concern the destinations of Swedish 
manufacturing exports.  It is therefore interesting to observe which countries most commonly 
function as export destinations for these firms.  Table 2 gives rankings of the 20 most popular 
destinations for Swedish manufacturing exports in 2007 in terms of the number of exporters 
and the value of exports.  These rankings use a sample of all manufacturing firms, to give an 
impression of overall Swedish exports rather than only of young firms. 
Number of Value of Swedish
Rank Country Swedish exporters Rank Country exports (bSEK)
1 Norway 4,809 1 Germany 82.94
2 Finland 2,093 2 United States of America 66.72
3 United States of America 1,989 3 United Kingdom 55.81
4 Denmark 1,895 4 Norway 42.30
5 Germany 1,879 5 France 41.71
6 United Kingdom 1,643 6 Belgium 40.06
9
10 Poland 1,310 10 Finland 26.07
7 Switzerland 1,626 7 Netherlands 38.30
8 Netherlands 1,463 8 Denmark 28.59
France 1,403 9 Italy 27.85
11 Belgium 1,228 11 Spain 23.46
12 Italy 1,200 12 Russia 16.66
13 Spain 1,178 13 China 16.36
14 China 1,115 14 Poland 15.05
15 Estonia 989 15 Japan 10.88
16 Austria 963 16 Australia 10.82
17 Japan 935 17 India 8.57
18 Australia 933 18 Canada 8.37
19 Iceland 912 19 Austria 8.24
20 Canada 868 20 Switzerland 7.41
 
Table 2.  Rankings of the 20 most popular export destinations for Swedish manufacturing firm
by the number of Swedish exporters (left) and by the value of Swedish exports (right).
The rankings in 
s in 2007 
 
n 
ly large (e.g. the United States of America, 
ina), relatively close to Sweden (e.g. Norway, Finland, and Denmark), or both 
Table 2 confirm the importance of market size and the distance from Swede
in determining the popularity of an export destination, consistent with a gravity model.  The 
most popular markets tend to be either relative
Japan, and Ch
(e.g. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom).  The most popular destination in terms of 
the number of exporters is Norway, which shares a long land border with Sweden and has 
22 much of its population concentrated in areas close to that border.  The most popular 
destination in terms of the value of exports is Germany, a neighbour of Sweden with vas
higher GDP than Norway, followed by the United States of America, a distant market but t
largest in the world in terms of GDP. 
5.  Results 
tly 
he 
Propositions 1 through 3 relate to firm productivity, so to test these predictions it is necessary 




5.1.  Proposition 1 
The prediction in proposition 1 is that firms w
markets more quickly.  That is, all else being equal, a more productive firm begins exporting 
m
productivity.  The delays are measured as the years since firm formation for the first market 
to produce estimates o
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which uses intermediate inputs to proxy for th
“transmitted” component of productivity and thereby to solve the endogeneity problem 
associated with firms increasing variable factor inputs in response to positive productivity 
shocks.
26  The Levinsohn-Petrin method is applied using value added as the measure of f
output and productivity is estimated separately for each two-digit industry.  The remainder of
this section outlines the empirical tests of the three propositions stated above. 
ith higher productivity levels enter export 
sooner and then adds new export markets at a faster rate than a less productive firm.  This 
relationship is tested by regressing the delay before entry to each export market on fir  
                                                 
26 The Levinsohn-Petrin method is a variation of that proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), which instead uses 
investments to proxy for unobserved productivity.  The principal advantage of the Levinsohn-Petrin method
over Olley-Pakes is that it produces productivity estimates for a larger number of firms, as each method r
nonzero amounts for the respective proxy variable, nonzero values being more common for intermediate inp
than for investments.  The productivity estimates from the two methods are highly correlated and lead to
qualitatively similar results, as indeed does productivity estimated as value added per worker, so the results 
appear not to be dependent on the choice of productivity measure in any case.  This is demonstrated for Table 6 
in the robustness checks presented in appendix 5; reproductions of the other regression tables using these 
alternative productivity estimates can be supplied upon request.  The Levinsohn-Petrin and Olley-Pakes 





dentification issues.  
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) note that the strict monotonicity of the proxy variable in terms of 
ts the 
ddress these problems, which is developed further by Wooldridge (2009). 
unobserved productivity is necessary to completely correct for endogeneity.  Furthermore, if the firm se
levels of the proxy and the variable input simultaneously, and both are deterministic functions of state variables 
and unobserved productivity, then the coefficient on the variable input is unidentified.  If the proxy and the 
variable input are set in different periods, then an endogeneity problem remains.  They propose an alternative 
method to a
23 and as the years since entry to the previous market for the second market onwards.
27  The 
following equation is estimated: 
( ) n n j n prod n n z t t , , , 1 , , exp ω ω ω ω ε γ β + + = − −  (7)
where  n t , ω  denotes the year of operation in which firm ω enters its nth export market,  pr
 
n od, β  
e is the coefficient on productivity for the delay before entry to the nth export market,  ω z  is th
(log) productivity of the firm as measured in its first year of operation,  n j,
 
γ  is the fixed effe
for industry j, and  n , ω
ct 
ε  is the error term.  By definition  0 , ω t  is the period of formation of firm 
ω, so the delay before entry to the first export market is measured from the time at which the 
firm is formed.  Equation (7) is estimated using a Poisson model, as the delays are 
constrained to be nonnegative and their distribution in the data resembles an exponential 
distribution.  The productivity coefficients from ordinary least squares estimation of (7) are 
included for comparison.  The productivity coefficients are given in Table 3 and are stated 
separately for the delay before commencement of exporting, the delay between entry times to 
each successive pair of markets, and the combination of these. 
Delay before Number of




t market -0.381*** -0.236*** 2,29
Second and -0.471*** -0.126*** 24,688
later markets (-7.31) (-7.81)
All markets -0.501*** -0.152*** 26,982
(-8.17) (-8.54)
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors, clustered
     by firm; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level,
     *** significant at 1% level  
Table 3.  Productivity coefficients for the delay before the commencement of exporting and between entry
times to all consecutive pairs of markets. 
   
The productivity coefficients displayed in Table 3 are each negative and strongly significant, 
confirming the prediction made in proposition 1: more productive firms begin exporting 
                                                 
27 It would also be possible to regress the number of markets entered in each year of operation on firm 
productivity, which yields qualitatively similar results, but this would falsely identify entry to a larger number of 
markets as faster entry: if a firm went on to enter a larger number of markets than another firm, then it would be 
identified as entering more markets per year, even if both firms added their export destinations at exactly the 
same rate. 
24 sooner and then go on to add further markets more quickly than less productive firms.
28  The 
coefficients for individual industries are presented in appendix 4.  In order to test for the 
possibility of these results being driven by the size or other characteristics of the firm rather 
than productivity, (7) is estimated using labour, capital, and capital intensity in log values as 
additional independent variables.  The resulting coefficients are displayed in Table 4. 
Delays before entry to all export markets
(Poisson) (Poisson) (Poisson) (Poisson) (Poisson) (Poisson)
  Productivity -0.501*** -0.348*** -0.359*** -0.377*** -0.341*** -0.481***
(-8.17) (-6.26) (-6.51) (-6.47) (-6.08) (-7.76)
  Number of -0.315*** -0.253***
  employees (-14.53) (-7.35)
  Wages -0.263***
(-13.39)
(-11.99) (-2.34)
    level, *** significant at 1% level
  Capital -0.172*** -0.053**
  Capital -0.098***
  intensity (-4.25)
  Number of
  observations
26,982 26,982 26,977 26,893 26,893 26,893
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
   
Table 4.  Productivity coefficients for the delay before the commencement of exporting to all consecutive 
pairs of markets. 
 
ir 
order, where all other aspects of the firms’ export entry strategies are the same.  This 
 
an entry times to a given pair of markets.  To test the 
proposition, the analysis conducted here includes firstly a test of the corollary that the first 
The results in Table 4 further support the prediction made in proposition 1.  While the 
number of employees, wages, capital, and capital intensity all contribute to the speed of entry,
the coefficient on firm productivity remains negative and strongly significant with the
inclusion. 
5.2.  Proposition 2 
The prediction made in proposition 2 is that more productive firms enter a larger market 
before a smaller market whereas less productive firms enter the same markets in the opposite 
prediction is not straightforward to test empirically, due to the difficulty of isolating strategies
comparable in all aspects other th
                                                 
 These results are robust to changes in the sample of firms, such as setting a minimum year of form  after 
1998 or a maximum year of formation before 2007, to the inclusion of year-of-formation fixed effe d to
28 ation
cts, an  a 
minimum export amount or duration of exporting to each destination, as demonstrated in appendix 5. 
25 mar o  kets entered are larger for more productive firms, followed by tests of entry orders t
particular pairs of markets in which the other aspects of the entry strategies are controlled for. 
To test the relationship between firm productivity and the size of the nth market entered, the 
following equation is estimated: 
n n j prod n z GDP , , , ω ω ω ε γ β + + =  (8) 
where   is the (log) GDP of the nth export market that firm ω enters,   is the (log) 
 as measured in its first year of operation (with coefficient 
n GDP , ω
productivity of the firm
ω z
prod β ), 
n j, γ  is the fixed effect for industry j, and  n , ω ε  is the error term.
29  The re om
estimation of (8) for each of a selection of ordinal markets are given in Table 5.  Though it is 
no ts 
for the full range of markets from the first to the thirtieth are plotted in Figure 5. 
sults fr  the 
t practical to include the coefficients for all markets in a table, the productivity coefficien
Market size in terms of GDP
1st market 2nd market 4th market 6th market 8th market 10th market 15th market 20th market 30th market
entered entered entered entered entered entered entered entered entered
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)( O L S )( O L S )( O L S )( O L S )
  Productivity 0.577*** 0.475*** 0.265*** 0.238*** 0.114 -0.022 -0.190 0.060 -0.048
(7.46) (4.78) (3.57) (2.65) (1.26) (-0.25) (-1.21) (0.38) (-0.26)
  R² 0.117 0.079 0.048 0.033 0.037 0.045 0.030 0.057 0.047
  Number of
  observations
2,294 1,704 1,199 987 875 779 586 436 264
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level  
Table 5.  Productivity and distance coefficients on the size of the first, second, etc. markets entered. 
                                                 
29 In cases where the firm enters more than one market in the same year, the size of the market is taken from the 
largest market entered in the period, so that entry to a small market as well as a large market is not confused for 
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Figure 5.  Productivity coefficients on the sizes of the first thirty markets entered (solid line) and the 
upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (dotted lines). 
The results displayed in Table 5 and Figure 5 indicate that the sizes of the initial markets 
entered are increasing in firm productivity, but that this relationship disappears for later 
markets.  This is in line with the theory, as the first markets entered are larger for more 




are the same.  Testing this 
proposition presents a challenge: restricting the sample to firms employing strategies that are 
es must be 
The approach used here is to test the order of entry between one or more given ‘small’ 
markets and a given ‘large’ market.  To control for other differences between the strategies, 
entering the larger markets.  For later markets, those entered by the more productive firm
would be smaller amongst firms that all enter the same markets, but this effect is muddied by
the diversity of factors at play in the selection of later markets, which may include low-
productivity firms entering small markets further abroad to gain experience before enterin
larger markets nearby.  The samples are also more homogeneous for later markets, as less 
productive exporters enter fewer markets and are therefore not included in the samples of 
entry to lower-ranked markets. 
More specifically, proposition 2 predicts that more productive firms enter a larger market 
before a smaller market whereas less productive firms enter the same markets in the opposite 
order, where all other aspects of the firms’ export entry strategies 
identical except for the entry times to two particular markets leaves only a small number of 
firms, because of the large number of potential markets and unobservable heterogeneity 
across firms.  To obtain a reasonably-sized sample, more variation between strategi
permitted. 
27 fixed effects representing the sets of all continents exported to are included in the regress
Only firms that eventually export to both markets are included, a condition that excludes 
firms that attempt to export to a ‘trial market’ but are unsuccessful and subsequently ceas
export: a possible manifestation of firms testing their uncertain exporting productivity rather 
than of the learning mechanism proposed in this paper.  Though it is difficult to completely 
separate the effects of the two mechanisms, excluding these temporary exporters reduces 
potential false confirmation of the learning mechanism.  Also excluded are many of the f









 ‘small’ and ‘large’ export 
markets.  The first restricts attention to EU countries and compares the entry times to the 
smaller neighbours of Sweden with the entry times to all larger markets.  The reason for 
focusing on EU markets is that within-EU exports
have total exports to EU countries of at least 1.5 million SEK in the same year, which could 
distort the comparison of entry times to EU and non-EU countries.  The second part of the 
u ur
Sweden, but different in size, where both markets are either inside or outside of the EU. 
 as an appropriate market for Swedish firms to gain experience in 
When comparing export markets, certain geographical, cultural, and institutional differen
are endemic and difficult to deal with.  One of the benefits of comparing the entry order 
specific pair of markets is that it includes a natural solution to this problem: as the 
geographical, cultural, and institutional differences between markets apply to all firms, thes
are simply captured in the constant terms. 
The analysis is conducted using two sets of definitions for the
 are only included in the data for firms that 
analysis uses pairs of markets that are similar to each other in c lt e and distance from 
In the first part of this analysis, the ‘small’ EU markets are comprised of Denmark, Finland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (henceforth the ‘neighbouring’ markets).
30  Each of these 
countries would serve
exporting, due to their proximity to Sweden and relatively small sizes.  To be comprehensive, 
the set of ‘large’ markets tested includes all countries in the EU with higher levels of GDP 
                                                 
30 Germany and Poland are not used because they are substantially larger than Sweden, while Estonia, Latvi
and Lithuania are not used because these countries acceded to the EU during the period of the data, so exports to
these markets may not be consistent over time.  In any case, the results are robust to the inclusion of these 
countries as neighbours. 
a, 
 
28 than any of the neighbouring EU countries.  The sample is restricted to firms hat enter the 
relevant large market and at least one of the neighbouring markets during the period of the 
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ω  is an indicator variable for firm ω (in industry j) entering at least one of th
small (neighbouring) markets before entering the large market,
32  ω z  is the (log) productivity
of firm ω as measured in its first year of operation (with coefficient  prod β ),  j γ  is the fixed 
effect for industry j,  ω δ  is the fixed effect for the set of continents exported to, and  ω ε  is the 
error term.   The productivity coefficients from the estimation of (9) are displayed in the 
first two columns of Table 6.  The se
, all 
rkets, the relationship is estimated using an ordered logistic 
model, fitting the following equation: 
33
cond column uses the fixed effects for the sets of 
continents exported to. 
The prediction made in proposition 2 also implies a negative correlation between firm 
productivity and the number of ‘small’ markets entered before entry to a ‘large’ market
else being equal.  As there is not necessarily a linear relationship between firm productivity 
and the number of small ma
ω ω ω ω ε δ γ β + + + = j prodz N  (10) 
where   is the number of neighbouring markets that firm ω (in industry j) enters before 
entering the US market and the other variables are defined as in equation (9).  Equation (10) 
                                                
ω N
 
31 The logistic model is appropriate to evaluating the factors influencing a choice between two discrete options.  
It imposes a specific structure on the regressions and therefore is not always applicable.  However, probit and 
ordinary least squares regressions using the same variables yield qualitatively similar results, as demonstrated in 
appendix 5. 
32 This combines firms that enter the large market first with firms that enter the neighbouring and large markets 
simultaneously, comparing both with firms that enter the neighbouring markets then the large market.  This is 
reasonable because firms that enter the two types of markets simultaneously are not able to gain exporting 
experience before entering the large market, just as with firms that enter the large market then the neighbouring 
markets.  In any case this assumption is not crucial, as the results also hold if firms that enter the large market in 
the same year that they enter their first neighbouring market are excluded. 
33 Continents are defined according to the United Nations M.49 definitions.  The continents are Europe, Asia, 
Africa, North America (including Central America and the Caribbean), South America, and Oceania. 
29 is estimated for the same large markets as equation (9) and using the same destination 
continent fixed effects.  The resulting productivity coefficients are displayed in the third and 
fourth columns of Table 6. 
Productivity coefficient for:
Large EU Prior entry to neighbouring Number of prior neighbouring Number of
market EU market(s) (I ω)E U  m a r k e t s  ( N ω) observations
(Logit) (Logit) (Ologit) (Ologit)
Germany -0.361** -0.265 -0.345** -0.233 784
(-2.23) (-1.46) (-2.17) (-1.27)
France -0.637** -0.636** -0.644** -0.637** 583
(-2.33) (-2.57) (-2.41) (-2.54)
United Kingdom -0.430** -0.336* -0.441** -0.343* 680
(-2.32) (-1.68) (-2.37) (-1.75)
Italy -0.653*** -0.620*** -0.593*** -0.566** 512
(-2.72) (-2.61) (-2.70) (-2.45)
Spain -0.645** -0.703** -0.549** -0.574** 516
(-2.27) (-2.15) (-2.24) (-2.17)
Netherlands -0.495*** -0.525** -0.502** -0.516** 603
(-2.61) (-2.56) (-2.55) (-2.48)
Belgium -0.639*** -0.620** -0.434** -0.417** 504
(-2.73) (-2.56) (-2.21) (-2.04)
Poland -0.168 -0.213 -0.069 -0.090 645
(-0.91) (-1.06) (-0.40) (-0.49)
Austria -0.207 -0.159 -0.197 -0.146 431
(-1.01) (-0.74) (-1.08) (-0.75)
Greece -0.385 -0.245 -0.307 -0.232 273
fixed effects
No Yes
(-1.12) (-0.66) (-0.96) (-0.71)
Set of export continent
Yes No
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
     level, *** significant at 1% level  
Table 6.  Productivity coefficients for entry to at least one neighbouring EU market (Denm
Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia) and for the number of neighbouring markets entered before entry to 




hich naturally fit the least well with the theory.  This confirms the 
prediction made in proposition 2: firms that enter neighbouring markets before entering each 
Table 6 confirms the prediction made in proposition 2.  Negative coefficients in Table 6 
imply a negative relationship between firm productivity and entry to at least one 
neighbouring market before entry to the large market ( ω I ), in the first two columns, and 
between firm productivity and the number of neighbouring markets entered before entry to 
the large market ( ω N ), in the third and fourth columns.  The coefficients are negative and 
significant for all but three of the larger EU markets, the only exceptions being the smallest 
of those markets, w
of these large markets are, in general, less productive than firms that enter the large market 
30 first, and less productive firms enter a larger number of neighbouring markets before entering
the large market. 
These findings are consistent with lower-productivity firms gaining experience by exporting 
to a smaller market, in which inefficiencies in setting up the operations would incur sm
losses, before expanding to export to a larger market.  The inclusion of destination continent 
fixed effects reduces the power of
 
aller 
 the tests, as it excludes some firms, but there is no clear 
overall effect on the magnitudes.  The productivity coefficients therefore do not seem to be an 
ust 
ies 
ajor port that 
would serve both countries.  Under these restrictions there are a limited number of pairs of 
rs to 
sample allows comparison of firms that enter the small market before the large market with 
all other firms that export to both.  The third sample allows a direct comparison of firms that 
enter the small market then the large market with firms that enter the two markets in the 
artefact of differences between broadly different exporting patterns.  These results are rob
to alternative methods of estimating firm productivity, measurement of productivity in 
periods other than the first year of operation, and minimum export amounts and durations, as 
shown in appendix 5. 
It would be reasonable to suspect that these results may be driven by the geographical or 
cultural proximity of the neighbouring markets to Sweden, rather than by their small size in 
comparison to the larger markets.  To address this point, the second set of tests of proposition 
2 is conducted using pairs of markets that are similar in terms of culture and distance from 
Sweden, but where one market is substantially larger than the other.  The most reliable way to 
control for distance in terms of the cost of transporting goods is to choose pairs of countr
that neighbour each other, while avoiding pairs of countries where one hosts a m
countries that have sufficiently many observations for Swedish manufacturing exporte
obtain meaningful results.  A handful of such pairs of markets from different regions are 
analysed.  These pairs of markets have relatively large numbers of observations, but the 
results are otherwise representative of other potential pairs of markets. 
Equation (9) is estimated for these pairs of countries using a logistic model, with the 
dependent variable indicating entry to the ‘small’ before entry to the ‘large’ market.  Three 
samples are used: all firms that eventually export to the large market; all firms that eventually 
export to both the small and the large market; and all firms that eventually export to both 
markets but enter them in different periods.  The first sample allows comparison of firms that 
enter the smaller market first with all other firms that export to the large market.  The second 
31 opposite order.  For brevity, the fixed effects for the sets of continents or regions exported to 
are not included.  The productivity coefficients from these regressions are shown in Table 7. 
Small market Large market Productivity coefficient
(Logit) (Logit) (Logit)
Belgium France -0.719** -0.920*** -0.993*
(-2.48) (-2.67) (-1.88)
[544] [388] [114]
Belarus Russia -1.218 -1.565* -1.336
(-1.63) (-1.94) (-1.56)
[156] [27] [23]
Canada United States -0.340* -1.143*** -1.123***
of America (-1.80) (-3.64) (-2.87)
[981] [428] [196]
Uruguay Argentina -0.453 -1.239 -0.887
(-0.61) (-1.02) (-0.73)
[77] [36] [21]
New Zealand Australia -0.919** -1.397** -1.207
(-2.04) (-2.17) (-1.32)
[312] [143] [60]
Only firms eventually exporting
to the large market
Yes Yes Yes
Only firms eventually exporting
to the small market
No Yes Yes
Only firms entering the two
No No Yes
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses;
     robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level,
markets in different years
 numbers of observations in square parentheses;
     *** significant at 1% level  
Table 7.  Productivity coefficients for entry to the small market before the large market for eac
pair of markets. 
The productivity coefficients displayed in 
h specified 
 
to both markets.  The coefficients for Belarus and Russia and for Uruguay and Argentina are 
                                                
Table 7 are consistent in sign with the theory but 
not significant for all of the samples, which may be due to small sample sizes.  The 
productivity coefficients are significant for Canada and the US and for New Zealand and 
Australia, pairs of countries with strong cultural similarities but that are isolated from other 
similar countries.
34  The coefficients for Belgium and France are also significant.  As with the
neighbouring and large EU markets, the productivity coefficients are larger in magnitude and 
more significant when the sample is restricted to firms that eventually enter the small market, 
as firms that enter only the large market are less productive on average than firms that export 
 
34 The relationship between firm productivity and the order of entry to Canada and the United States is treated in 
more detail in appendix 6, with comparisons of all six of the strategies (as defined above) that are possible in a 
scenario where there are two potential export markets. 
32 negative in magnitude but not significant, as few Swedish firms export to these combination
of markets; results consistent with many pairs of similar markets in these an
s 
d other regions.  









ostly to enter markets 
simultaneously: this could explain the empirical results presented here, but only to the extent 
e learning mechanism presented above. 
 
e e ry ord
ts.  Th
different periods has no overall effect on the magnitude of the coefficients. 
While the model was shown in the tests of proposition 1 to correctly predict the relationship 
between firm productivity and the speed of entry, the confirmation of proposition 2 supports 
the proposed learning mechanism as the explanation for this relationship.  Among firms that
export to a given pair of markets, lower productivity firms are shown here to tend to expo
the smaller market first and then to the larger market.  This pattern is difficult to explain i
markets are entered; and (3) is increasing in the size of the market subsequently entered
The learning mechanism proposed in this paper satisfies these conditions, as could the 
uncertainty models of Nguyen (2011), Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2011), and 
Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012).  These models could explain some of 
the empirical results presented above, in particular the speed of entry.  However, the Sw
data show that firms that export first to a smaller market and then to a larger market are more 
productive than firms that export only to the larger market.  This feature of the data is 
consistent with the learning mechanism presented here, for some parameters, but the reverse 
of what a model based on firms learning about uncertain exporting profitability would 
predict.  Furthermore, the number of small markets entered before a large market is found to
be decreasing in firm productivity, which is predicted by the model presented here does
fit as well with a model of uncertain exporting profitability.  Another candidate mechanism 
would be a credit or management constraint that makes it more c
that it is equivalent to th
5.3.  Proposition 3 
Proposition 3 predicts that nearer markets will be entered no later than more distant markets. 
To test this proposition, the ranks of the markets in th xport ent ers of firms are 
regressed on the distances to the marke e order of entry to new export markets by each 
firm is observed and each of these is assigned a rank  i r , ω , where  1 , = i r ω  if country i is the 
first export market entered by firm ω, 2 , = i r ω  if country  arket entered  i is the second export m
33 by firm ω, and so on.  The following equation is estimated with the 
variables in logs: 
distance and GDP 
( ) i j i i distGDP i GDP i dist i t GDP dist r , , ω ω GDP dis ε γ β β β + + ⋅ + + =  (1
where  i r , ω  is  ran arket i in the order of entry for firm ω,  i dist  is the (log) distance 
from Sweden o country i (with coefficient  dist
1) 
 the k of m
 t β ), GD  is the (log) GDP of market i ( ith 
coefficient  GDP
i P w
β ),  distGDP β  is the coefficient on the interaction between distance to and G
of market i,  j
DP 
γ  is the fixed effect for industry j, and  i , ω ε  is the error term.  Equation (11) is 
estimated using different combinations of the distance and GDP variables and for each 
quartile of firm productivity levels.  The results of the estimation of (11) using ordinary least 
squares are shown in Table 8. 
Rank in market entry order
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
  Distance 6.378*** 6.692*** 26.715*** 4.087*** 5.233*** 4.690*** 8.148***
(59.26) (64.23) (11.56) (26.69) (27.54) (25.41) (35.05)
  GDP -3.433*** -3.629*** 2.207***
(-38.64) (-41.25) (3.56)




1st 2nd 3rd 4th
  Number of
26,982 26,982 26,982 26,982 5,325 6,843 6,380 8,434
 at 1% level
  observations
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant  
Table 8.  Distance and market size coefficients for the ranks of markets in terms of the order of entry. 
The results in Table 8 are consistent with the prediction made in proposition 3.  The 
coefficient on distance is positive in the position of the firm in the order of entry and is
significant for all specifications of the model.  Whether or not destination GDP is controlled 
 highly 
for or the interaction term is included, the coefficient on distance is positive and highly 
esults also hold for each productivity quartile.  Overall, there results 
strategic decision made by a firm that is 
significant.  The r
strongly support the prediction made in proposition 3. 
6.  Conclusion 
Experience in exporting has been shown to reduce the costs of entering further export 
markets.  By integrating this observation into an otherwise standard trade model, this paper 
offers a simple framework for understanding the 
34 planning to begin exporting and has several potential export markets.  The model generate
diversity of export expansion strategies through a simple and intuitive mechanism based on
the costs of entry to new export markets. 
The model produces novel and intuitive predictions about the relationships between firm 
characteristics and the type of exporting pattern employed.  In particular, more productive 
s a 
 
firms are predicted to enter new export destinations at a faster rate and to enter larger markets 
 
at the 
rting, an alternative explanation, is excluded as productivity is 
measured in the first year of operation for each firm.  Furthermore, this mechanism explains 
h 
above would continue to hold.  Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such an extension would 
earlier and smaller markets later.  In addition, firms generally enter nearer markets first and
then expand to progressively more distant markets.  These predictions are tested and 
confirmed using a firm-level panel of Swedish manufacturing data from 1997 to 2007. 
The learning mechanism proposed in this paper, in which the fixed cost of entering a new 
export market is reduced by experience at setting up export operations, is powerful in 
explaining the export expansion patterns of Swedish firms.  In particular, the model offers an 
intuitive explanation for the timing of entry to export markets and for the orders of market 
entry, as reflected in the predictions outlined above.  Importantly, the effect of productivity 
on the order of entry, identified in the empirical tests for proposition 2, suggests th
learning effect is relevant.  If firms did not gain from the experience of exporting, then there 
would be no incentive for lower productivity firms to begin by exporting to smaller markets 
and progress to larger markets whereas higher productivity firms enter the same markets in 
the opposite order.  The potential for such an effect to be driven by productivity 
improvements from expo
part of the variation in export entry orders in the Swedish data, and could also explain part of 
the variation observed in French data by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) and in Iris
data by Lawless (2009). 
Entry into new export markets is naturally associated with a measure of uncertainty, a feature 
that would ideally be included in a more complete model.  The mechanism included in 
Nguyen (2011), Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2011), and Albornoz, Calvo 
Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012), in which firms may enter some markets to test their 
exporting profitability before deciding whether to expand further, is a reasonable and 
intuitive treatment of exporting uncertainty.  It would be possible to expand the model 
presented here to include such an uncertainty mechanism, though the predictions presented 
35 generate any predictions beyond those contained in the current paper and those cited above.  
Nevertheless, as both the learning mechanism presented here and the uncertainty mechanism
are intuitive and have empirical support, a more comprehensive model of export market 
expansion would include both mechanisms. Similarly, the ten
 
dency for firms to enter markets 




orts to any given market, 
exports are indirectly promoted to other markets.  When the market for which exports are 
all relative to the markets subsequently entered, the overall return may be 
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K., Frazer, G., 2006. Stru
s and country size dependent beachhead costs. CEPR 
Albornoz, F., Calvo Pardo, H., Corcos, G Journal 
Anderson, J., van Wincoop, E., 2003. Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle. 
Anders nomic Literature 42 (3), 
Arkolakis, C
Arnold
sis. Review of World Economics 141 (2), 219–243. 
and Chaney (2011) reflects a correlation between entry costs for similar markets, which 
would also be a desirable feature for a more detailed model. 
The results presented in this paper have potential implications for the design of policy.  In 
particular, the potential for exporting experience in a small market to ease subsequent en
larger markets suggests that trade facilitation may have a greater return if conducted in 
countries that are smaller and nearer to the home market, as these markets are easier to en
for firms close to the productivity threshold for exporting.  If the fixed costs of entering 
further markets are thereby decreased, then these firms may go on to enter markets that wo
not otherwise have been profitable.  By directly promoting exp
promoted is sm
higher for any given level of investment in export promotion. 
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Appendix 2 
This appendix demonstrates formally the imp
conditions on the functional form of 
lications of the three necessary and sufficient 
( ) t i
X n s f , .  To begin with, the net profit from market i 




⎣ − = i t t t i i i i ,
1 β
 (12) 
arket i m t 
 the reductions in the fixed costs of entering further markets. 
Condition 1 
The first condition is that the fixed cost of entry function be increasing in market size and 
non-increasing per unit of market size, so that   and 
⎤ ⎡
− =
− i X t n s f s a
1 1 σ φ β π
Equation (12) is the net profit that the firm gains from market i.  This should, however, be 
interpreted with caution, as the contribution that exporting to m akes to aggregate ne
profit should also take account of
0 > s f
X s f f
X X
s ≤ .  Dividing (12) by 






































































Combining (13) and (14) yields: 
() ()



































4 4 4 43 42
i ds
 (15) 
40 The right hand side of (15) is nonnegative because of the condition that the fixed cost 
function exhibit nonnegative economies of scale, or  s f f
X X
s ≤ .  It follows that whenever 
the net exporting profit  i π  is positive,  i i s ∂ ∂π  is positive (strictly provided a market of zero 
size would yield negative profit).  Net exporting profit is therefore increasing in market size. 
Condition 2 
The second condition is that the fixed cost of e
markets entered, so that  .  The partial derivative of (12) in terms of the period of entry 
 is: 

















































The sign of  (
 
) i π β ln en market i is profitable, which reflects discounting when 
entry to the market is delayed.  The expression ins  square brackets in (16) is weakl
e, as the fixed entry costs are strictly decreasing if associated with prior entry to m
determines the net benefit of delaying entry. 
 
rkets but constant if no other m
 
is negative wh
ide the y 
negativ ore 
ma arkets are entered.  The trade-off between these two factors 
 If the fixed entry cost were not reduced by 
() 0 , = t t i
X df dn n s , then the expression in the square brackets in (16) would  experience, so
be zero and the overall benefit of delaying entry,  i i t ∂ ∂π , would be strictly negative for 
0 > i π .  Then it would never be optimal to delay entry and firms would simply e l 
profitable export markets immediately. 
Condition 3 
The third condition is that the reductions in the fixed costs fr
nter al
om experience be larger for 
larger markets, so that .  Consider two export markets i and j, for which  .  
Consider two strategies,  , which are identical except that the entry times
and j are reversed, such that  .  The difference in payoffs between thes o 
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strategies comes directly from (12):
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The relative sizes of and distances to markets i and j are parameters, so the difference 
between  i is φ  and  j js φ  has the same sign for all firms.  The sign of (18) is therefo
for all fi s, so all enter markets i and j in the same order.  If  , then (17) can be 
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 (19)
If  i i j j s s φ φ ≤ , then (19) is strictly negative and strategy b is trivially preferred  irm by all f s, as 
aller market first implies lower overall fixed entry costs and higher overall 
nues.  If
entering the sm
  i i j j s s φ φ >
ove some
, then the sign of (19) depends on the parameters and firm 
 threshold it is positive and vice versa.  Therefore, firms 
exporting reve
productivity: for 
σ − 1 a  ab
enter the two markets in different orders depending on their productivity.  However, this is 
only possible if the cross-derivative on the fixed cost function is negative, so  0 <
X
sn f . 
Appendix 3 
Proof of proposition 1 





1 φ β  of the optimal strategy 
is weakly increasing in firm productivity.  Where all markets concerned are of positive si
are finitely costly to transport goods to, a
ze, 
nd ar e, the effect on A of 
entering market i earlier, so  , is to increase A by 
e entered within finite tim
0 1
i i t t < [ ] 0
0 1
> − i i
t t s
i i φ β β .  The same 
reasoning applies to all markets, so A is decreasing in the number of periods it takes to enter a 
given set of markets.  As firm productivity levels are weakly increasing in the aggressiveness 
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weakly decreasing in firm productivity. 
Proof of proposition 2 
Consider two potential export destinations, i and j, with  i j s s > .  Consider two strategies, a 
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43 firms, then strategy a must be optimal for firms above some productivity threshold and 
Suppose that there is a monotonically increasing relationship between distance and the cost of 
transporting goods.  The partial derivative of the net profit from market i (12) in terms of the 
transport cost parameter
strategy b optimal for all firms below the threshold. 
Proof of proposition 3 























The right hand side of (23) is strictly positive for any 
σ − 1 a , reflecting that the net profit from
1 3) 
 
an export market is strictly decreasing in the distance to that market.  All else equal, due to 
s optimal to enter the more profitable market first, so among markets of 
The industry-by-industry productivity coefficients from the regressions run on equation (7) 
are displayed in Table 9.  These are analogous to the results displayed in Table 3, but from 
separate regressions run on the firms from each individual industry. 
discounting it i




code Industry First market later markets All markets
(Poisson) (Poisson) (Poisson)
20 Wood, cork, and cane products -0.305* -0.591** -0.593***
excluding furniture (-1.69) (-2.53) (-3.38)
[203] [1,029] [1,232]
21 Pulp and paper -0.382 -0.645** -0.640***
(-1.36) (-2.30) (-2.76)
[59] [1,068] [1,127]
22 Publishing; graphic and recorded -0.513** -0.419*** -0.472***
media (-2.47) (-2.98) (-3.61)
[221] [985] [1,206]
24 Chemicals and chemical products -0.607** -0.476** -0.481**
(-2.08) (-1.99) (-2.10)
[111] [2,303] [2,414]
25 Rubber and plastic products -1.052* -0.477** -0.537**
(-1.83) (-2.02) (-2.34)
[153] [2,166] [2,319]
26 Non-metallic mineral products -0.465 -0.467 -0.511
(-1.06) (-1.29) (-1.49)
[73] [566] [639]
27 Steel and metal production -1.190*** -0.473* -0.542*
(-2.79) (-1.75) (-1.92)
[82] [1,217] [1,299]
28 Metal products excluding -0.687*** -0.821*** -0.887***
machinery and equipment (-3.05) (-4.35) (-4.74)
[478] [2,716] [3,194]
29 Machinery not included in -0.485*** -0.612*** -0.637***
other categories (-2.86) (-6.80) (-7.16)
[334] [5,744] [6,078]
31 Other electrical machinery -0.040 -0.416*** -0.408**
and products (-0.18) (-2.62) (-2.50)
[135] [1,955] [2,090]
32 Telecommunications products -0.010 -0.724*** -0.611***
(-0.07) (-4.23) (-4.22)
[74] [943] [1,017]
33 Precision instruments, medical -0.639*** -0.434*** -0.550***
and optical instruments, clocks (-3.99) (-2.86) (-3.80)
[84] [1,766] [1,850]
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, -0.069 -0.247 -0.235
semitrailers (-0.27) (-1.26) (-1.24)
[79] [683] [762]
35 Other transport equipment 0.277 -0.172 -0.142
(1.36) (-1.32) (-1.13)
[49] [431] [480]
36 Furniture, other manufacturing -0.511* -0.318 -0.421*
(-1.93) (-1.36) (-1.78)
[116] [928] [1,044]
37 Recycling 0.032 -0.779*** -0.648***
(0.05) (-3.19) (-3.12)
[43] [188] [231]
All -0.168*** -0.288*** -0.290***
(-2.68) (-7.46) (-7.72)
[2,294] [24,688] [26,982]
All with industry fixed effects -0.381*** -0.471*** -0.501***
(-5.42) (-7.31) (-8.17)
[2,294] [24,688] [26,982]
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; numbers of observations in square parentheses; robust standard errors;
     * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level  
Table 9.  Productivity coefficients for the delay before the commencement of exporting and between entry 
times to all consecutive pairs of markets, for firms in each manufacturing industry. 
45 The productivity coefficients displayed in Table 9 are negative and significant for most 
industries, supporting the prediction made in proposition 1.  The productivity coefficient for 
all industries is negative and strongly significant whether or not industry fixed effects are 
included in the regressions.  However, the magnitude of the coefficient is only consistent with 
those for the individual industries if industry fixed effect are included.  This is because of 
substantial differences between industries in the magnitudes of estimated productivity levels, 
meaning that it is appropriate to use industry fixed effects when comparing firms in different 
industries. 
Appendix 5 
This appendix contains robustness checks for the empirical tests of the propositions 
conducted above.  To begin with, the fundamental criterion for the definition of a ‘new’ firm 
is that it not appear in the first year of the data.  One potential problem is the possibility of 
some firms being temporarily inactive in 1997 and thus misclassified as being ‘new’.  
Another is the potential for selection bias resulting from the short period of time for which 
firms formed in the last years of the panel are observed.  To check for these possibilities, 
Table 3 is reproduced using several alternative definitions of ‘new’ firms, with the results 
displayed in Table 10.  The assumptions used are as follows: column 1 uses year of formation 
fixed effects; columns 2 through 7 vary the latest year of formation; column 8 uses the same 
assumptions as in Table 3; and columns 9 through 12 vary the earliest year of formation. 
Delay before Productivity coefficients
entry to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First market -0.349*** -0.486*** -0.470*** -0.390*** -0.374*** -0.347*** -0.351*** -0.381*** -0.355*** -0.295*** -0.237*** -0.230***
(-5.01) (-4.89) (-5.07) (-4.50) (-4.76) (-4.81) (-4.96) (-5.42) (-4.65) (-4.12) (-2.88) (-2.62)
Second and -0.465*** -0.552*** -0.537*** -0.430*** -0.461*** -0.463*** -0.463*** -0.471*** -0.429*** -0.397*** -0.358*** -0.415***
later markets (-7.31) (-8.05) (-8.14) (-6.02) (-6.68) (-7.01) (-7.18) (-7.31) (-6.96) (-5.76) (-5.12) (-5.56)
All markets -0.499*** -0.593*** -0.578*** -0.469*** -0.495*** -0.493*** -0.492*** -0.501*** -0.459*** -0.416*** -0.373*** -0.413***
(-8.12) (-8.95) (-9.21) (-6.73) (-7.46) (-7.83) (-8.01) (-8.17) (-8.00) (-6.70) (-5.72) (-5.94)
Minimum YOF 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Maximum YOF 2007 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
Y O F  f i x e d  e f f e c t s ? Y e sN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o
Numbers of 2,294 1,263 1,494 1,715 1,922 2,069 2,191 2,294 1,955 1,607 1,307 1,031
observations 24,688 16,674 18,790 20,389 22,404 23,301 23,971 24,688 20,559 16,152 11,988 8,014
26,982 17,937 20,284 22,104 24,326 25,370 26,162 26,982 22,514 17,759 13,295 9,045
  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors, clustered by firm; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level  
Table 10.  Reproduction of Table 3 with year of formation fixed effects and with the sample restricted to 
various minimum and maximum years of formation. 
The results displayed in Table 10 support the results displayed in Table 3.  The coefficients 
are consistently negative and significant, in line with the theory, for all specifications, and do 
not vary widely in magnitude.  The only substantial difference is that when fewer years of 
formation are used, the smaller sample size reduces the power of the tests. 
46 Table 11 gives the results for robustness checks on the empirical tests of proposition 2.  The 
table reproduces the productivity coefficients on entry to at least one neighbouring EU 
market before entry to each large EU market from Table 6 using various alternative 
assumptions.  Analogous exercises for the other empirical tests yield similar results.  The 
assumptions used in Table 11 are as follows: column 1 uses the same assumptions as in Table 
6; columns 2 and 3 estimate the same coefficients using a probit model and ordinary least 
squares, respectively; columns 4 through 7 put various lower limits on export amounts and 
durations; columns 8 and 9 vary the year in which productivity is measured; and columns 10 
through 12 use value added per worker, OLS, and the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to 
estimate productivity. 
Large EU Productivity coefficient
market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Germany -0.361** -0.222** -0.052** -0.391** -0.395* -0.834*** -0.417 -0.357** -0.727*** -0.160 0.037 -1.318*
(-2.23) (-2.33) (-2.13) (-2.39) (-1.89) (-2.90) (-1.63) (-2.03) (-2.91) (-1.25) (0.24) (-1.82)
[784] [784] [784] [750] [646] [369] [436] [475] [322] [1,181] [1,155] [603]
France -0.637** -0.369*** -0.112*** -0.482* -0.710** -0.815* -1.037*** -0.495*** -1.004*** -0.376** -0.264* -2.889***
(-2.33) (-2.63) (-2.80) (-1.95) (-2.19) (-1.77) (-2.96) (-2.79) (-3.34) (-2.56) (-1.66) (-3.39)
[583] [583] [583] [544] [435] [241] [306] [353] [249] [868] [847] [412]
United Kingdom -0.430** -0.258** -0.072** -0.454** -0.262 -0.281 -0.387 -0.176 -0.389 -0.156 0.043 -1.093
(-2.32) (-2.37) (-2.32) (-2.31) (-1.22) (-1.03) (-1.22) (-0.97) (-1.40) (-1.17) (0.27) (-1.15)
[680] [680] [680] [645] [567] [321] [376] [420] [290] [1,031] [1,005] [531]
Italy -0.653*** -0.395*** -0.126*** -0.704** -0.784* -0.343 -1.036*** -0.523** -1.110*** -0.366** -0.187 -1.603*
(-2.72) (-2.87) (-2.80) (-2.28) (-1.95) (-0.92) (-2.69) (-2.29) (-3.56) (-2.48) (-1.18) (-1.82)
[512] [512] [516] [477] [406] [189] [272] [319] [228] [754] [742] [370]
Spain -0.645** -0.379** -0.129*** -0.590** -0.645* -1.728*** -1.164*** -0.572*** -1.321*** -0.441*** -0.329** -2.941***
(-2.27) (-2.56) (-2.65) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-3.52) (-2.94) (-3.09) (-3.55) (-2.85) (-2.13) (-3.33)
[516] [516] [516] [471] [356] [186] [254] [317] [214] [755] [738] [363]
Netherlands -0.495*** -0.297*** -0.089** -0.505*** -0.391* -0.845** -0.860*** -0.162 -0.445* -0.256** -0.105 -1.654**
(-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.50) (-2.58) (-1.79) (-2.11) (-2.61) (-0.91) (-1.84) (-2.00) (-0.71) (-2.15)
[603] [603] [603] [561] [458] [227] [321] [375] [259] [915] [897] [464]
Belgium -0.639*** -0.383*** -0.112*** -0.416* -0.710*** -1.127*** -0.735* -0.232 -0.668** -0.527*** -0.331* -3.147***
(-2.73) (-2.76) (-2.67) (-1.84) (-2.66) (-3.15) (-1.80) (-1.16) (-2.33) (-3.45) (-1.94) (-3.15)
[504] [504] [504] [464] [349] [180] [238] [308] [226] [764] [748] [365]
Poland -0.168 -0.103 -0.037 -0.180 -0.191 -0.372 -0.055 -0.242 -0.263 -0.051 0.195 -1.612**
(-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.87) (-1.33) (-0.18) (-1.19) (-0.96) (-0.43) (1.38) (-2.40)
[645] [645] [645] [558] [406] [195] [286] [404] [294] [944] [923] [474]
Austria -0.207 -0.133 -0.045 -0.370 -0.439 -0.513 -0.596* -0.516** -0.745* -0.104 0.004 -1.742**
(-1.01) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-1.47) (-1.38) (-0.95) (-1.77) (-2.04) (-1.86) (-0.72) (0.03) (-2.22)
[431] [431] [431] [383] [277] [119] [215] [265] [184] [652] [639] [313]
Greece -0.385 -0.222 -0.082 -0.179 0.221 -1.201 -0.558 -1.141** -1.157** -0.095 0.076 -1.542*
(-1.12) (-1.25) (-1.21) (-0.70) (0.77) (-1.56) (-1.01) (-2.47) (-2.51) (-0.55) (0.42) (-1.73)
[273] [273] [275] [247] [166] [66] [133] [167] [123] [399] [391] [194]
Regression technique Logit Probit OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Minimum export size - - - 10000 100000 1000000 - - - - - -
M i n i m u m  e x p o r t  d u r a t i o n ------ 3  y e a r s -----
Year of operation for firm 
productivity
























  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; numbers of observations in square parentheses; robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level  
Table 11.  Reproduction of the first column of Table 6 using various alternative assumptions. 
The results in Table 11 show that each of the alternative assumptions produces results similar 
to those produced in Table 6.  The use of either a probit model or ordinary least squares 
produces results that are qualitatively similar, so the results are not driven by any restriction 
implied by the use of the logistic model.  Setting minimum amounts on exports has the 
benefit of removing potentially noisy small exports, but the only apparent effect is to reduce 
the power of the tests rather than to affect the magnitude of the coefficients.  Similarly, 
47 restricting the sample to exports that continue uninterrupted for at least three years has no 
discernible effects on the magnitudes of the coefficients.  In any case this may not be a 
reasonable restriction, as an ongoing exporting relationship may nevertheless not involve 
shipments each year. 
The alternative productivity assumptions do not qualitatively change the results, besides 
reducing the sample size.  The results are not changed by using the productivity estimate 
from the firm’s third year of operation, which captures some of the firm’s development in the 
first years that it operates, or using the estimate for 2000, an arbitrarily-chosen year.  Finally, 
the results are qualitatively similar when using value added per worker, OLS, or Olley-Pakes 
estimates of productivity, suggesting that the results are not simply a product of 
idiosyncrasies of the Levinsohn-Petrin method of estimating productivity. 
Appendix 6 
Restricting our attention to two possible export markets, there are six possible strategies.  
These strategies are: (1) export to neither market; (2) export to the smaller market only; (3) 
export to the larger market only; (4) export first to the smaller market then enter the larger 
market; (5) export first to the larger market then enter the smaller market; or (6) begin 
exporting to both markets in the same period.  According to the theory, these strategies are 
ordered from least to most aggressive (with the exception of strategies 3 and 4, for which the 
relationship is ambiguous).  This appendix extends the empirical tests of proposition 2 to a 
comparison between each pair of these six strategies for one particular pair of export markets: 
Canada and the United States. 
The approach used here is to test, using the logistic regression model described by equation 
(9), the choice of each strategy against each of the lower-numbered (generally less 
aggressive) alternatives.  In each case, the sample is limited to those firms that adopt one of 
the two strategies in question.  The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 12.  
Here the choice being tested for is of a more aggressive strategy over a less aggressive 
strategy, so positive productivity coefficients are consistent with the theory (with the 
exception of the choice between strategies 3 and 4, for which the theory does not provide a 
definite prediction). 
48 Alternative Productivity coefficient for choice of:
strategy Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 6
Strategy 1 0.456 0.272* 0.097 1.403*** 1.870***
(0.80) (1.84) (0.23) (4.87) (6.48)
[2,251] [2,886] [2,309] [2,429] [2,503]
Strategy 2 -0.120 -0.468 0.813* 0.990***
(-0.41) (-0.77) (1.94) (2.64)
[ 5 6 5 ][ 7 3 ][ 1 9 2 ] [ 2 6 0 ]
Strategy 3 -0.064 0.662*** 0.897***
(-0.31) (3.49) (3.96)
[591] [711] [785]






  Note: t-statistics in parentheses; numbers of observations in square parentheses;
     robust standard errors; * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level,
     *** significant at 1% level  
Table 12.  Productivity coefficients for the choices between pairs of potential strategies. 
Most of the productivity coefficients in Table 12 are positive and none are negative, 
supporting the ordering of strategies implied by the theory.  One insignificant productivity 
coefficient relates to the choice between strategies 3 and 4, which is ambiguous in the model, 
and two have relatively small sample sizes.  In general, the more aggressive strategies are 
employed by significantly more productive firms.  This relationship is also apparent from the 
productivity distributions of the firms that employ each of the six strategies.  The cumulative 
density functions of firms that employ each of the six strategies are plotted in Figure 6, with 
average productivity levels weighted to correct for inter-industry differences in productivity. 
49  
Figure 6.  Cumulative density functions of firm productivity levels for the six potential strategies. 
From Figure 6 it is possible to observe that, for most pairs of strategies, firms that adopt the 
more aggressive strategy are generally more productive.  However, what is striking in Figure 
6 is that this relationship holds for a wide range of productivity quantiles.  On the other hand, 
there is clearly no strict sorting of firms into strategies by productivity level, as all of the 
distributions overlap. 
50 